His dilemma ―on the horns of which he impaled himself repeatedly-was that if he defined his terms in a non-psychologistic way no one would understand him at all because his approach was too alien to the prevailing ways of thinking whereas if he defined them psychologistically his readers might gain some idea, but a badly distorted one. The purpose of his special semiotic terminology was that of making it possible to break out of psychologistic stance toward meaning-phenomena. In his later writings, when psychology was beginning to flourish, Peirce sometimes uses such terms with the awareness that they might be misconstrued, but with the idea that others probably will grasp little of his meaning unless they first understand him psychologistically. This point is driven home by Ransdell “Peirce’s use of mentalistic terminology does not usually indicate a shift to a psychological perspective, because these terms did not bear the meaning for him that they usually bear for the contemporary reader. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.ĭespite appearances to the contrary, Peirce’s mentalistic terminology does not contradict his repeated statements that his doctrine of signs is not psychologically based nor is it at variance with Peirce’s own early work in experimental psychology. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. It consists in the joint declaration’s special purpose: the legal consequences that enhance what would otherwise be a trivial and inconsequential transaction. This third element is the clue for a correct interpretation. Contractual acts are themselves acts in which as future exchange is foreshadowed by a present, symbolic exchange.
But a contract is more than two promises amalgamated. That would make a contract a dual promise from speaker to hearer and vice versa. A promise, in its simplest form, is an act in which a speaker manifests his or her intention, based upon his or her volition, to perform some act in the future. A contract, the chapter concludes, must be understood as a relational speech-act. Peirce’s remarks on contract, one is confronted with in-depth philosophical considerations, whereas the dimensions of translation not only cover linguistic issues but more in general the various levels of meaning in legal discourse and in everyday language as well as their proper translatability. The text of this chapter has it all: focusing on Ch.
Obligations have since millennia their legal form in the concept of contract legal scholars have since reflected upon the issue in all social, political, and cultural circumstances and philosophers treated contract as a particular form of inter-subjectivity.
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